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 Why do (or do not) banks share customer information? 





Credit bureaus administering information sharing among lenders about customers reduce 
information asymmetry and should be key to modern credit markets. In contrast to former 
studies, we show that willingness to share information depends more on institutions and 
market concentration than on demand or other market characteristics such as, regional 
diversity or local monopolies. We show using infinite period models with strategic behavior 
that lenders’ interest to share information depends on market concentration and the type of 
information sharing arrangement. Sharing bad information only is the dominant strategy if 
banks think long-term. If banks are myopic no information sharing may occur. 
JEL: D23, D81, D82, D92, G21 
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Információ-megosztás a bankok között a hitelkártya 
piacon 




Tanulmányomban a bankok – illetve általánosabban a hitel-nyújtók – közötti információ-
megosztás és az információ-árazás kérdéseit elemzem a hitelkártya piacokon. Bár az 
információ-megosztás problémáit az utóbbi években számos szerző vizsgálta, az eredmények 
egyelőre igen kezdetlegesek. Írásom azonban nemcsak a hitelkártya-információk 
megosztására vonatkozik, következtetései annál jóval általánosabbak. Szemben a korábbi 
elemzésekkel bemutatom, hogy a hitelnyújtók hajlandóságát az ügyfeleikről rendelkezésükre 
álló információk megosztására elsősorban nem a keresleti oldali tényezők – tehát a vevők 
rezervációs árai, kockázatossága, vagy a piaci kereslet regionális eloszlása – befolyásolják, 
hanem a piaci intézmények és a kínálati oldal határozzák meg. Az elemzés alapját végtelen 
periódusú dinamikus programozási modellek képezik, amelyek felírásánál mind a 
hitelfelvevők, mind a hitelnyújtók oldalán stratégiai viselkedést tételezek fel. Az elemzés 
legfőbb eredménye az, hogy a hitelnyújtók domináns stratégiája a kockázatos („rossz”) 
ügyfelekről történő információ-megosztás és soha nem a teljes körű információ-megosztás. 
Ez azonban csak akkor igaz, ha a hitelnyújtók hosszú távú előrelátással rendelkeznek. Ha a 
hitelnyújtók „rövidlátók”, domináns stratégiájuk az információ-megosztás elutasítása lesz, 
különösen akkor, ha a hitelnyújtók piaci részesedése egyenlőtlen. 
Tárgyszavak:  
Kockázat és bizonytalanság, Hitelpiacok – Aszimmetrikus információ, Vállalati döntés az 
időben, Bankok és pénzügyi szervezetek 
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This paper is a contribution to the literature on information sharing as a separate strategic 
decision of the firms in imperfect markets.
1 I use the banks’ decision problem in private 
credit markets as an example to represent the strategic implications of information 
sharing. I develop a simple infinite period model for oligopolistic private credit markets 
where banks arrive at the “current period” with unequal market shares. 
  When banks offer loans to customers they sell a non-conventional commodity: 
customers do not pay for it when they make the purchase. Banks will get the price of the 
loan later, if ever.
2 Selling loans to unknown customers is a high-risk business. 
Consequently, information about customers is the most important – and also the most 
valuable – input banks use in offering private loans. A bank that has complete 
information about customers can and it presumably will pursue a completely different 
pricing and competition strategy than a bank that has no prior information or it has just 
fragmented information about its actual and potential customers. The more banks know 
about customers the less costly it is to them, in terms of reduced risk and lower default 
rates, to offer loans provided that they can refuse to serve bad customers. This may be a 
well-founded justification for banks to share information about their customers. Why 
cannot I find yet a large number of countries where banks share information? A few 
exceptions exist. For instance, banks usually submit information about their own 
customers to, and buy information about other banks’ customers from independent credit 
bureaus in the United States. However, such credit bureaus can be barely found in other 
                                                 
* Research to this paper was supported by an NSF grant no. 0242076/2003, and by the joint NSF–
Hungarian Academy of Sciences–Hungarian Science Foundation grant no. 83/2003. I greatly benefited 
from the discussions and from several written communication with Joel Sobel. I am also grateful to Judit 
Badics, Andras Simonovits and to Joel Watson for their comments and suggestions. But the first thanks 
should go to Mark Machina who not only helped me with his invaluable and insightful comments but also 
encouraged me to finish this work. Needless to say, all the errors in the text are mine. 
1 The only articles I have come across on information sharing in credit card markets is Pagano and Jappelli 
(1993), Vercammen (1995), and Padilla and Pagano (1997). The first paper analyzes a market with regional 
monopolies that may have been the past in the US credit card markets but do not exist in the US nor in 
other countries today. Vercammen presents a moral hazard cum adverse selection approach to information 
sharing without explicitly addressing the banks’ optimization problem. Padilla and Pagano also focus on 
reputation games driven by the borrowers effort and welfare. Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Crawford 
and Sobel (1982), Clarke (1983), and Gal-Or (1985) presented models of information sharing in two-stage 
games but their focus has been the noisy nature of information. Ausubel (1991) discussed the case of the 
US credit card markets without engaging deeply in the analysis of information sharing. 
2 Banks may require a deposit from customers before they sell the loan, or they may ask for collateral from 
customers. These aspects of the transaction are extensively discussed in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Our 
assertion still holds that customers pay the price of the loan after the transaction. 
  1countries. The first question I try to answer is: why cannot I see more credit bureaus in 
existence in countries with advanced credit card markets and in countries with emerging 
credit card markets? 
  The second question I ask is as follows: is it really in the banks’ interest to share full 
information or would they prefer to share only a part – or a certain type – of the 
information about customers? I shall show that banks do not have an incentive to share 
information about good customers while they all would be better off by sharing 
information about bad customers in a market where information sharing occurs through 
credit rating agencies. 
  An additional and normative rather than positive question is how would an efficient 
market for customer information look like? What we see in a few markets is a number of 
independent agencies that receive all the information banks have about their customers. A 
bank that wants to purchase information from a credit bureau “pays” the price of 
submitting its entire customer information base first. In addition, the bank pays for each 
record of information to the credit rating agency. This seems really strange for it is fairly 
obvious that a large and a small bank would exchange information at completely different 
terms of exchange had they been able to transact information directly.  
  I could certainly point to the historical, institutional and legal factors that explain, at 
least in part, the lack or the limited extent of information sharing and information 
transactions among banks. Without denying the importance of the factors mentioned 
before, I take a different approach. I try to find the economic incentives of the banks that 
may work in favor of, or against information sharing. 
  Our hypotheses are as follows: 
1.  The banks’ incentive to share or not to share information can be explained by the 
size structure of the private credit market. Notably, in a market where a large bank 
has dominant market share, the incentive of the large banks to share information 
will be profoundly different from – as I shall show it will be adverse to – the 
interest of the smaller banks. Thus, I hypothesize that the more equal the banks’ 
market shares the stronger the banks’ incentive will be to share information about 
customers. I shall also show that in addition to market shares it is the number of 
the banks in the market that has a decisive impact on banks’ attitude toward 
information sharing. 
2.  Banks would gain from sharing information about bad customers but they would 
not from information sharing about good customers, provided that banks operate 
in the market “forever.” 
3.  I assume that banks are fully rational profit maximizers in the private credit 
market. But the time horizon of their profit maximization behavior matters. While 
banks would have a clear incentive to share bad information in an infinite period 
horizon it is not so in the short run. Banks lose in one period but they gain in the 
subsequent period from the lack of information sharing. If a bank knows that it 
will get many bad customers in the current period – who did not repay to other 
banks – but a larger share of non-paying bad customers will go to other banks in 
the subsequent period, this bank will have a “fluctuating” interest in information 
sharing. Since the share of non-paying bad customers alternates period by period 
for all banks, the short-term interest of a bank to gain from the limited number of 
bad customers – and the additional “bonus” that other banks may go under 
  2because of the large number of bad customers they receive – may be in conflict 
with the long-term incentive to minimize the number of bad customers for all 
banks. Consequently, it is not crystal clear whether banks with very unequal 
market shares will initiate information sharing about bad customers. 
  I am especially interested in newly emerging private credit markets that I shall label 
“transition markets.”
3 It is obvious that there is an important difference between a 
transition market and a mature private credit market. Notably, the transition market had 
an “initial phase” in the recent past when the market for private credit was established. 
Before the private credit market emerged the residential market had been dominated by a 
state-owned savings bank. The state-owned bank held the accounts of all citizens in the 
country, but it did not have relevant information about its customers’ credit history and 
repayment behavior for such transactions had not existed between customers and the 
bank. 
  Customers’ credit history and the banks’ knowledge about their customers’ 
repayment behavior has been an important part of the banks’ operation in mature 
markets. It may well be the case that the “initial period effect” has a long lasting or even 
a permanent impact on the steady state of the transition markets. I am interested in the 
question: will the equilibrium market structure in a mature market look very different 
from what we can find in a transition market in equilibrium? I start with the more general 
case: with the mature market. Then I turn to the emerging markets. Our fourth hypothesis 
is that there is an initial period effect in emerging markets but this effect does not have a 
long lasting impact. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows: I list describe the assumptions and notations 
in section 2. I outline the model of full information sharing in a mature market in section 
3. I discuss the case of information sharing only about bad customers in section 4, and 
information sharing only about good customers in section 5. Section 6 presents the model 
of banks’ competition without information sharing. I address the welfare implications and 
of regulated information markets in section 7. I outline the model of the transition market 
in section 8. Discussion and conclusions follow in section 9. 
 




                                                 
3 The paper covers only a small portion of the research we have done about emerging credit card markets. 
Rona-Tas and members of the research team conducted interviews with bank officials in eleven countries, 
including China, Vietnam, South Korea and eight Central and East European countries. In addition, they 
collected information from Visa, from Fair Isaac, and from other organizations in the US. 
  3Customers live exactly for two periods.
4 Hence, half of the customers enter the market as 
“young” and half of them leave the market in each period. I assume that the number of 
customers is normalized to one. The size of the population is fixed.
5 Customers are 
characterized by their “reliability type” – type can be “good” or “bad” – their valuation 
and their history. A fraction γ of the customers is “good type” and a fraction (1 – γ) is 
“bad type.” Customers’ type does not change over time. “Good” customers always repay 
the loan, while “bad” customers never intend to repay. 
  Customers may borrow $1 or they don’t borrow at all. I assume that a customer can 
borrow only from one bank in one period. Customers have net valuation of the loan v so 
that their total benefit from a $1 loan is (1 + v). Customers’ valuation does not change 
over time. For the sake of simplicity I assume that  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ v  is uniformly distributed. I 
also assume that customers’ valuation is independent of their type. This assumption 
asserts that customers’ valuation is a matter of how they value the project they are 
borrowing for, while their type is given by “Nature.” At this point I make an assumption 
about customers’ valuation. I assume that good customers’ valuation is verifiable to the 
banks in the sense that banks know: only those customers borrow whose valuation is 
equal to or larger than the market rate of interest banks charge. I shall show that bad 
customers may have a strategic interest in repaying the loan in the first period in order to 
get the loan and not repay it in the second period, if there is information sharing among 
banks about bad customers. Consequently, bad customers’ valuation also becomes 
verifiable to banks if they share “bad information.” 
  Customers’ history is simple. History consists of the timing of the customer’s actions: 
when did a customer enter the market, and when did she borrow if she borrowed at all. 
The number of all customers who actually borrow in period t will be denoted . A 
customer will be labeled experienced, if she borrowed from any bank before. I shall call a 
customer inexperienced if she has not borrowed from any bank before. A customer who 
had borrowed from one or more banks before, but goes to a new bank will be regarded by 
this new bank as an unknown customer in case if there is no information sharing among 




 A  customer’s  history consists of the fact that she entered the market in period (t – 1) 
as “good” or “bad” with valuation v. In addition, the customer’s history comprises 
everything that actually happened or could have happened to the customer in the former 
                                                 
4 I could have assumed that customers live for T > 2 periods. Such a generalization would have had two 
important implications: (1) Customers’ options to act strategically would be more numerous than in case if 
customers live only for two periods. (2) The number of periods would have had an additional impact on the 
customer base if that number were larger than the number of banks that operate in the market. Old bad 
customers who already went to all banks would drop out from the market before they “decease.” Until the 
number of periods is not larger than the number of banks, I could have changed the share of customers who 
exit the market at the end of each period from 1/2 to 1/T. Consequently, the share of surviving customers 
would have been (T – 1)/T. 
Dealing with T > 2 periods would have complicated the analysis to a considerable extent without adding 
much to the insight I intend to gain about banks’ interest in information sharing. Consequently, I assume 
that T = 2, and the number of banks is not smaller than the number of periods customers live through. 
5 This assumption could have been easily relaxed by saying that the market population is increasing with a 
λ rate. In order to keep the model simple, I disregard the change in the size of the market population. 
  4period(s):  . A customer can take the following actions 
 in subsequent periods: 
() ( ) ) ( ), , ( ), ( 1 i A B G r i v i h t
C
t − =
( ) ( ), ( 1 i A i A t t− )
In period t – 1 (when she is “young”) 
-  She decides to borrow and repay the loan [ ] ) ( 1 i yt− ; 
-  She decides to borrow and does not repay [ ] ) ( 1 i yt− ; 
-  She decides not to borrow[ ] ) ( 1 i dt− . 
In period (t) (when she is “old”) 
1.  She decides to borrow and repay the loan if 
(a) she borrowed and repaid in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i y i y t t − ; 
(b) she borrowed and did not repay in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i n i y t t − ; 
(c) she did not borrow in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i d i y t t − ; 
2.  She borrows and does not repay if 
(a) she borrowed and repaid the loan in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i y i n t t − ; 
(b) she borrowed and did not repay in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i n i n t t − ; 
(c) she did not borrow in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i d i n t t − ; 
3.  She does not borrow if 
(a) she borrowed and repaid in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i y i d t t − ; 
(b) she borrowed and did not repay in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i n i d t t − ; 
(c) she did not borrow in the previous period[ ] ) ( ), ( 1 i d i d t t − ; 
  A customer’s strategy is a function that maps her type, valuation and history into the 
sequence of her conceivable actions: 
{} ( ) C i i h v B G r i n i y
C
t t t t ∈ = , ) ( , ), , ( ) ( ), ( , 0 φ , (1) 
where   is the type of the customer, v is her valuation,  denotes the history of 
customer i up to period t, and {  are the customer’s possible decisions to 
borrow, to borrow and not to repay the loan, or not to borrow in period t, respectively. If 
customers lived more than two periods, their history would be longer and each 
customer’s strategy set would be much larger. 
) , ( B G r ) ( 1 i h
C
t−
} ) ( ), ( ), ( i d i n i y t t t
  In theory, a customer can choose from nine strategy options if she or he lives for two 
periods as can be seen above. But our assumption that good customers always repay 
implies that I also assume: if a good customer did not repay, her payoff would decline to 
. Consequently, we can exclude the strategies 1 (e), 2 (e) and 3 (e) for a good 
customer. Similarly, strategies 1 (a), (b), (c), 2 (c) and 3 (a), (c) are either unfeasible or 
will never be chosen by a bad customer. Thus, a bad customer can choose either 2 (a) or 3 
(b) if banks share information about bad customers, or 2 (b) if banks do not share bad 
information. 
∞ −
  A customer’s pay-off is the expected discounted consumer surplus, denoted  of 
her or his actions during all periods she has been present in the market, contingent on the 
actions chosen by the banks. Denoting consumer i’s payoff 
i , her action 
iand bank k’s 
action 
) (i u
t u t c
{ }
U
t t Q G ,  in period t – where   are the number of known good and 
U
t t Q G   and  
  5unknown customers served by all banks – the consumer’s payoff from two periods will 
be: 












t G c c u Q c u i U , , ) ( 1 1 1 1 − − − − + = δ . (3) 
  We can assume that customers make myopic choices or they act strategically. Myopic 
customer behavior means that a customer’s decision to borrow does not depend on future 
expected benefits. I assume strategic customer behavior. If a customer acts strategically, 
she may accept an initial loss in return of larger future benefits. But there is a substantial 
difference between the strategic behavior of a good and a bad customer. A good customer 
may always accept an initial loss denoted  t Δ  in order to be recognized by the bank to be 
good.
6 A good customer who is willing to suffer an initial loss expects to get the loan at a 
lower interest rate in the next period. If banks are willing to sell loans to known 
customers at a lower interest rate I shall call such a pricing strategy of the banks “straight 
price discrimination.”
7 A good customer’s total expected consumer surplus (her expected 
payoff) from two periods with straight price discrimination will be: 
( t t G r v R v U − + − = − ) δ 1 , (4) 
where   are the high and the low interest rates, respectively, and  t t r R    and    1 − ( 1 , 0 ∈ ) δ  is 
the discount factor. 
  If banks ask a lower interest rate from known customers who repaid the loan than 
from unknown customers, a young good customer is willing to borrow at an initial loss if 
() (t t t R v r v R v − ≥ − + − − ) δ δ 1 . The initial loss will be  ( ) 1 , 0 ) ( ∈ Δ = Δ t t . We can find the 
expression for   from the indifference condition of the marginal good customer. The 
marginal good customer will be the person whose valuation is . The 
marginal good customer is indifferent between borrowing at a loss 
t Δ
t t R v Δ − = −1
*
t Δ  in the initial period 
but gaining a consumer surplus at a lower interest rate in the second period, or not 
borrowing the loan in the first period and gaining a surplus at a higher interest rate – 
which is charged to unknown customers – in the second period of her life. From the 
above conditions we have: 
() ( ) ( t t t t t t
t t
r R R v r v
R v
− = Δ ⇒ − = − + Δ −







Since all good customers who have higher valuations than   will borrow, the number of 








t t R v Δ + −
=
− − γ γ
. (6) 
  A young bad customer can also act strategically. He can borrow and repay the loan in 
the first period in order to get the loan and refuse to repay in the second period. Hence the 
young bad customer would act “against his type” if such a behavior results in a larger 
expected consumer surplus than not repaying. It is evident that bad customers will only 
                                                 
6 Joel Sobel suggested that I should assume strategic customer behavior and he proposed the idea of an 
initial loss that a good customer is willing to accept. 
7 It is also possible – as I shall discuss in a later section – that banks offer loans to unknown customers at a 
lower and to known customers at a higher interest rate. I shall call this pricing strategy “inverse price 
discrimination.” 
  6choose such a behavior if they risk not to get the loan in both periods of their life. This 
can only happen if there is information sharing about bad customers among banks. If 
banks do not share information about bad customers then a bad customer will borrow and 
refuse to repay in both periods. If  there  is information sharing about bad customers 
among banks – and banks apply straight price discrimination – the marginal bad customer 
will be the one who is indifferent between borrowing and repaying in the initial period 
then borrowing and not repaying in the second period, or borrowing and not repaying in 
the initial period:  
* *
1
* v v R v t = + − − δ , or 
δ
1 * − =
t R
v . (7) 
It is easy to see that the marginal bad customer would not accept an initial loss for his 
expected consumer surplus would be smaller than without the initial loss. The number of 



















B . (8) 
A bad customer whose valuation is  1 − < t R v  will only borrow in the initial period and 
gain consumer surplus:  . The number of bad customers who borrow and do not 













  Banks can price discriminate in the opposite direction, too. Namely, they can offer 
loans at a higher interest rate to known and at a lower rate to unknown customers in order 
to induce more customers to borrow and repay. I label this pricing strategy “inverse” 
price discrimination. It is obvious that good customers do not borrow at an initial loss if 
they can expect to pay a higher interest rate in the second period when they are 
experienced. It is also evident that a young good customer would prefer to remain 
unknown and borrow at a lower interest rate in both periods – provided that   – 
than stay with her original bank and borrow at a higher interest rate in the second period. 
But in case if banks can identify known good customers and prevent them to borrow as 
unknown in both periods, a good customer has a strategy choice. She can borrow and 
repay in both periods or borrow and repay only in the second period if she expects a 
lower interest rate in the second than in the first period of her life in the market. 
Consequently, a fraction of good customers who have higher valuation than the interest 
rate when they are young postpone taking the loan and suffering an initial loss with this 
decision. The marginal good customer will be indifferent between these two options if: 
1 − ≤ t t R r
() ( ) ( t t
t t
t t r r
v r r


















δ ) . (9) 
It important to note that the interest rate banks charge to unknown customers will 
decrease over time:  .  t t r r > −1
  If banks use inverse price discrimination the marginal bad customer will be that 
person who is indifferent between borrowing and repaying in the first then borrowing and 
defaulting in the second period, or borrowing and not repaying only in the second period: 
  7v v r v t = + − δ . Thus, the number of bad customers who borrow and repay in the first 
period will be:  ()
2
) 1 ( t r − − δ γ
. Consequently, 
2
) 1 ( t r γ −





A number of “K” banks operate in the private credit market ( ) ∞ < = ,... 2 , 1 K . For the 
sake of simplicity I assume that banks’ marginal production cost of selling an additional 
unit of private loan is zero, and I also disregard banks’ startup costs. Although there is an 
opportunity cost banks incur because they use their funds for extending private credits, I 
assume that the opportunity cost is zero. I also assume that banks do not pay (with cash) 
for the information they acquire about customers from a credit rating agency.
8 In 
addition, banks face the cost that is imposed upon them by borrowers who do not repay 
the loan. Banks’ gross benefit from extending a $1 loan equals (1 + R) if the loan is 
repaid, where R is the interest rate banks charge to customers. 
  We can make many different assumptions about how customers will allocate 
themselves among banks. I shall assume that good customers go to banks according to 
the banks’ market share in the former period – larger banks get more young good 




Proposition 1: Given the assumptions about the allocation of customers across banks we 
can write down the quantity competition model in terms of prices. That is, the number of 
unknown good customers who borrow from bank k in period t will be 
()
2
1 ) ( 1 1 + − Δ + − t t t R k s γ
, provided that bank k serves all types of customers and banks 
apply straight price discrimination. (I shall separately discuss the case when bank k 
decides to serve only known good customers.) The number of young bad customers who 






) 1 ( − −
, while the number of young bad customers who 






) 1 ( −
. If banks rely on inverse price discrimination, the relevant 
formulas will be:  ()
2
1 ) ( 1 t t r k s − − γ













) 1 ( −
. 
 
Proof: The proposition follows from the definitions in (6) – (9).  ▄ 
  
                                                 
8 In reality, there is a moderate amount charged by the credit bureau to banks for each record they acquire, 
but I shall ignore this cost. 
9 I could have assumed uniform distribution of all customers or the allocation of customers by market 
share. Or, young good customers could distribute themselves uniformly while bad customers allocate 
themselves across banks by market share.  I believe that the assumption I made above is more realistic than 
the other options. 
  8Banks announce their pricing strategy for unknown customers at each period before 
customers decide to borrow or not to borrow. Once a new customer learned the 
conditions of borrowing and signed a contract with the bank, there is no possibility of 
reneging on the banks’ side, nor can the banks unilaterally alter the conditions of the 
loan. Banks can apply uniform pricing, straight price discrimination or inverse price 
discrimination. If banks pursue the strategy of straight price discrimination there are 
several ways how they can differentiate between the interest rates they charge to known 
and to unknown customers. Banks announce at the beginning of each period that the 
customers who borrowed and repaid in period (t – 1) will get the loan at a lower interest 
rate in period t for which:  () t t t t r R R t δ δ − = Δ ,  or  t Δ for short. The rewarding strategy of 
the banks may have many different forms. The general form of the initial loss would 
be: . I shall work with a simpler formula that is linear in .  () ( ( t t t R f t R t , , Δ = Δ ) ) t R
  After customers allocated themselves across banks, banks make simultaneous 
decisions in a mature market. I assume that banks have entered the market with unequal 
market shares in mature markets and also in transition markets. But banks establish their 
initial market share in a non-simultaneous way in transition markets during the “initial” 
period. After then they engage in a simultaneous quantity setting competition for infinite 
periods. We can have at least two different settings for the banks’ competition in the case 
of the transition market in the initial period. We can assume that there is a large old bank 
that had existed prior to the private credit market, and several small banks enter the 
market in the initial period. The small banks have capacity constrains in the initial period. 
Since all banks know that bad customers will turn randomly to banks, small banks will 
want to sell their total capacity in order to get as many good customers as possible. The 
large bank will act as a monopoly over residual demand in the initial period, assuming 
that banks have a large enough capacity to serve all customers who turn to them for the 
loan. Then banks play a simultaneous quantity competition in subsequent periods. In the 
other setting, the large old bank may act as a Stackelberg leader in the initial period. Then 
banks play a simultaneous quantity competition in the second period when the smaller 
banks already established themselves in the market and they do not accept the large bank 
as a market leader anymore. I apply the first assumption about banks: the small banks 
have capacity constraints in the initial period, and the large bank chooses the quantity of 
borrowers as a monopoly over residual demand. 
  Banks know the customers’ market demand function but banks cannot identify 
individual customers by the customer’s valuation. Banks know the history of their known 
customers – the history of repayment – but banks do not have information, without 
information sharing, about unknown customers. Banks also know that a good customer 
will always remain good and a bad customer will remain bad over his lifetime in the 
market. I assume in the current paper that customers’ valuation and type is independent 
of their income. Otherwise I should have dealt with issues of moral hazard and adverse 
selection that would have further complicated the analysis. 
  Banks maximize expected discounted profit from infinite periods by setting quantities 
in a Cournot competition game. Banks can also be represented by their history, strategy 
and payoff. Banks’ history consists of everything that has happened to each bank until the 
current period. The question is how far should we go back in history? Banks’ history is 
the infinite past in mature markets. But the knowledge a bank accumulates about 
customers during two successive periods becomes useless after these customers exit the 
  9market. New generations of customers will enter the market and information about each 
generation is relevant only for two periods. 
  “Everything” in the banks’ history means how many customers borrowed in the 
market in previous periods. I denote the number of customers   bank k serves in 
period t. If banks know the number of customers who borrowed during the former period 
immediately implies how many customers did not borrow. In addition, banks’ history 
consists of the information how many known good customers, denoted , did each 
bank serve. The number of unknown customers a bank sells to in a given period will 
be: . Finally, history includes the number of banks that 
served customers in subsequent periods. I assume that in case if a bank decided once to 
serve only its known good customers that is the number of its unknown customers is zero, 
then the bank cannot revert to selling to unknown customers again. Thus, the history of 
bank k is: 
) (k qt
) (k gt
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The bank’s strategy is a function from the bank’s history into non-negative pairs of real 
numbers ( ) ) ( ), ( k g k q t
U
t , that is, into the number of unknown customers and known good 
customers to be served: 






t = . (11) 
A bank’s strategy set consists of all conceivable strategies a bank can pursue. Given the 
total number of customers and the distribution of good and bad customers among banks 
and the number of banks in the market, a bank has the following strategy options: 
1.  It sells to known good and to unknown customers at a uniform price if it sold to 
known and to unknown customers in the previous period:  ( )() [ ] 1 1 , − − t t t t R q R q ; 
2.  It sells to known good customers at a lower and to unknown customers at a higher 
price if it sold to known and to unknown customers in the former period: 
() ( ) { } ()( ) { } [ ] 1 1 1 1 , − − − − t
U
t t t t
U
t t t R q r g R q r g ; 
3.  It sells to known good customers at a higher and to unknown customers at a lower 
price if it sold to known and to unknown customers in the former period: 
()( ) { } ()( ) { } [ ] 1 1 1 1 , − − − − t
U
t t t t
U
t t t r q R g r q R g ; 
4.  It sells only to known good customers in period t if it sold to known and to 
unknown customers in the former period:  ( ) { } ( )() { } [ ] 1 1 1 1 , − − − − t
U
t t t t t R q r g R g ; 
5.  Does not sell (exit the market) if it sold only to good customers in the previous 
period:    () [] 1 1 , 0 − − t t t R g
The bank’s payoff from a certain strategy is the expected discounted profit from pursuing 















t k q k b k g k π δ π )
                                                
. (12) 
 
10 The may reader recall that customers’ strategy set consisted of nine strategy options and banks can 
choose from five different strategies the payoff matrix will have 45 cells. But we also know that good 
customers will only choose from among six strategies and bad customers will choose between two 
strategies at maximum. Consequently, a good customer faces a payoff matrix of 30 cells and a bad 
customer needs to deal with a payoff matrix of 10 cells. 
  10  I define the equilibrium as follows: banks set quantities in the market for unknown 
customers that satisfy the Nash equilibrium conditions with the Markov property 
discussed above. That is, banks’ quantities are best responses to all other banks’ quantity 
choice, conditioned on the customers’ history of being good or bad. Prices adjust to 
quantities in the market for known and for unknown customers. Customers allocate 
themselves among banks and market(s) clear in each period. 
 
  11Information and information sharing 
 
Customers learn the conditions of borrowing for two periods when they enter the market. 
Consequently they can make fairly simple strategic decisions. We need to separately 
discuss what happens if a bank decides to go out of business after the current period. 
  Banks have relevant information about their former customers – that is, on their 
known customers – when they offer the loan. In a more general setting – where, for 
instance, customers would live for more than two periods or they could borrow different 
amounts in subsequent periods – customers could migrate back and forth among banks. 
As I already discussed, it will not happen in our simple world. New customers are 
allocated among banks according to banks’ market share. Banks will always have full 
information on their known good and bad customers. 
  Banks cannot discover the past history of the customers of other banks if there is no 
information sharing among banks. Banks cannot identify the valuation of individual 
customers. They can only know the valuation of the marginal customers and the 
aggregate valuation of all customers who borrow from them. Banks also know whether a 
known customer repaid the loan with interest or he did not. Consumers do not know 
whether they will obtain or not the loan before they actually borrow. 
  Banks can join three different types of information sharing systems. The first one is 
when banks share information only about their bad customers (a “black list”). When 
banks have access to a joint black list of customers they can avoid the known bad 
customers of other banks. Another form of information sharing system is when banks 
have access to information about other banks’ good customers (“white list”). This gives 
banks an opportunity to steel the good customers of other banks. Finally, banks may 
share information on bad and on good customers (“full list”). Sharing full information 
encompasses all the opportunities that banks possess by having access to a black list and 
to a white list. As we shall see the information sharing regime banks choose is 
endogenous in the market model. In addition, the type of information sharing has a direct 
effect on how many customers can borrow at all in a given period. 
  What are the potential institutions of information sharing banks can rely on? One way 
of joining an information system for a bank is as it works in the United States. Banks 
submit the files of their served customers to credit bureaus without having financially 
compensated for these files. Then banks can purchase sets of customer information from 
the credit bureaus. Only those banks can purchase information, which submitted their 
own customer files to the credit bureau. Sending in the customer files to the credit bureau 
is a special “entrance fee” banks need to pay in order to be able to purchase other banks’ 
files on a unit price basis.
11
  Theoretically, it would be possible for banks to buy and sell directly to and from other 
banks. Moreover, banks could exchange information on a “one for one” basis, that is, 
bank A would disclose information about a certain number of its customers to bank B and 
it would get information on an equal number of customers from bank B in return. We do 
not see these direct transactions to happen between banks. It would need an extensive 
analysis why a “free market” of customer information does not exist. Such a study is 
beyond the scope and capabilities of this paper. I shall just briefly address the issue how 
                                                 
11 One may think of this pricing rule as a special form of a two-part tariff. 
  12banks would value customer information in an unregulated information market in the 
discussion section. 
 
Infinite period quantity competition among banks with and without information 
sharing in a mature market 
 
After having outlined the modeling assumptions I write down the models with different 
information sharing systems. 
 
3. Full information sharing 
 
With full information sharing banks know all experienced good and bad customers. There 
will be two markets: one for known customers and another one for unknown customers. 
Known bad customers will be turned away by the banks. Banks have several options to 
choose from: 
1.  Banks can compete for known good customers and sell loans at a lower interest 
rate to known good and at a higher interest rate to unknown customers; 
2.  Banks can sell to their own known good customers – forgoing the opportunity to 
get the good customers of other banks – at a lower and to unknown customers at a 
higher interest rate; 
3.  Banks can compete for known good customers and sell loans at a higher interest 
rate to known good and at a lower interest rate to unknown customers; 
4.  Banks can sell to their own known good customers at a higher and to unknown 
customers at a lower interest rate; 
5.  Banks can sell loans at a uniform interest rate to all customers; 
6.  Banks can sell only to own known good customers. 
  If banks sell loans at different interest rates to known good and to unknown 
customers, good customers and young bad customers face different strategy choices 
contingent on the banks’ pricing policy. 
1.  If banks sell at a lower interest rate to known good customers, a young good 
customer will accept an initial loss when she first acquires the loan with the 
anticipation that she will get a better deal from the bank after she will have repaid 
the loan after one period (straight price discrimination). 
2.  If banks sell at a lower interest rate to all unknown customers than to known good 
customers, a known good customer will not accept an initial loss (inverse price 
discrimination). 
3.  As we have seen young bad customers also have a strategy choice: they can take 
and repay the loan in the first period and they can refuse to repay in the next 
period. Or, they can default in the first period. 
I shall only present the case of straight price discrimination. Inverse price discrimination 
can be described in a very similar way. In addition, banks do not need information about 
experienced good customers in order to apply straight price discrimination as I shall 
show. It is different with inverse price discrimination: banks need to know experienced 
good customers otherwise those customers would go to a new bank as inexperienced and 
would take the loan at the lower interest rate offered to unknown customers. Inverse price 
discrimination may dominate straight price discrimination if the share of bad customers is 
  13fairly high in the banking population. But in case if banks incur costs with acquiring 
“good” information, straight discrimination may be more profitable than inverse 
discrimination even with a larger fraction of bad customers. 
  If young good customers borrow at an initial loss and a portion of young bad 
customers also borrow and repay the loan in the first period, the number of known 
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Only larger banks can earn positive profit from competition as (14) shows. A bank’s 










− >  to obtain positive profit from known good 
customers with competition, where   are the number of bad customers who 
repaid and the number of known good customers in the market, respectively, in period t. 
But the higher the ratio of good to bad customers 
t
G
t G B   and   1 −
) 1 /( γ γ − or/and the larger the number 
of banks in the market the less restrictive the market share constraint on profit becomes. 
  If banks chose not to compete for known good customers, but they would rather keep 
all their own good customers the interest rate they need to charge to these customers is: 
. Banks’ profit from known good customers without competition becomes 
in period t: 
t t t R r Δ − = −1
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− > , where 
 are now the number of bad customers who repaid and the number of good 
customers in the market without competition in period t. Since the number of good 
customers will be larger if banks compete, competition among banks would set a softer 
constraint to banks’ market share than the lack of competition. As can be seen from (15) 
the initial loss connects the two markets of the banks. Small banks – banks with a less 
than average market share – will have an interest to compete for known good customers 
of other banks for they cannot earn positive profits on this customer group. Competition 
would reduce the interest rate to known good customers. Consequently, more good 
customers would borrow. But the number of bad customers who do not repay when they 
are “old” would also increase. In addition, competition for known good customers would 
t
G
t G B   and   1 −
  14affect the interest rate banks can charge to unknown customers conflicting with the profit 
maximization objectives of the banks.
12
  I show first that banks will not choose to compete for known good customers of other 
banks. If small banks coax competition, banks find the lower interest rate from competing 
for known good customers. Banks maximize: 
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where  ) (k π is bank k’s profit in equilibrium. In theory T can be finite or  . I shall show 




Lemma 1: Banks’ competition for known good customers would result in an interest rate 
for known customers that cannot be the optimum choice of the banks. 
 
Proof: Banks maximize in steady state: 
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  (18) 
After summing over all k and rearranging banks need to solve the following simultaneous 
equations to find the equilibrium interest rates: 
()
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  (19) 
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12 I could have addressed this issue more deeply only in the framework of a price competition model that I 
shall not do in this paper. 







γ . But the lower interest rate cannot be positive at this fraction of good 
customers. Consequently, banks will not want to compete for known good customers of 
other banks.  ▄ 
 
Since banks will not compete for known good customers of other banks they have an 
incentive to serve all own known good customers. Consequently, the interest rate they 
charge to these customers will be t t t R r Δ − = −1 . Now I turn to unknown customers. Since 
I shall express the number of customers who borrow in each period in terms of the 
interest rate they pay I need to find which group of customers will be able and willing to 
borrow. I showed in Proposition 1 that there will be three groups in each vintage of 
customers. But theoretically, there could be a fourth group of good customers who 
borrow. This is the group of unknown “old” good customers who have a lower valuation 
than the interest rate charged to unknown customers minus the initial loss that the 
marginal good customer accepted when these customers were “young.” These customers 
could borrow in the second period provided that the interest rate charged to unknown 
customers is lower in period t than it was in period t – 1. I show that this is not possible. 
 
Lemma 2: It is an important consequence of the banks’ competitive behavior that good 
customers who did not borrow in the first period will not be able to borrow when they 
grow “old,” for . The interest rate banks charge to unknown customers cannot 
decrease. 
t t R R ≤ −1
 
Proof: The interest rate banks charge to known good customers with straight price 





























  ▄ 
 
We can also see this if we think about the nature of competition among banks. Since 
banks get young good customers by their market shares while they get an equal number 
of young bad customers, the smallest banks cannot earn non-negative profits. Fewer 
banks will serve all customers and market concentration drives the interest rates higher. 
  After having shown that there will not be competition for known good customers 
among banks, and unknown customers who did not borrow in their first period in the 
market will not be able to borrow in their second period either, we can draw some 
important conclusions about the initial loss young good customers accept. 
  Given the assumptions about the size of the banking population, about the fraction of 
good and bad customers in each vintage and about straight price discrimination we can 
formulate the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1: If banks apply straight price discrimination they do not need to share good 
information. 
  16 
Proof: Any bank will know that only good experienced customers would go to another 
bank if that other bank offered the loan with better terms than the rest of the banks, for 
bad experienced customers will not repay. Thus, the group of unknown customers banks 
serve will consist of three sub-groups: the sub-group of “young” good unknown 
customers, the sub-group of bad unknown customers who repay the loan, 
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The total number of customers who acquire the loan will be: 
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Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of the results we obtained about the banks’ 
competitive behavior and about the optimum strategy of good and bad customers. It is 
sufficient for banks to know the fraction of bad customers and they can infer the expected 
behavior of good customers from this piece of information. 
  ▄ 
 
Now we need to deal with the infinite horizon of the banks’ profit maximization problem. 
It is more convenient to describe the banks’ maximization problem in terms of quantities 
rather than prices so I shall do so when I present the dynamic programming problem of 
the banks. After I proved that the infinite horizon dynamic programming problem can be 
simplified to a chain of two period optimizations during finite periods plus a single period 
optimization problem for infinite periods, I shall return to the original presentation of the 
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where I denoted bad customers who act as good in one period ( ) ) (k B
G
t and bad customers 
who act according to their type ( ) ) (k B
B
t . The control variable of the dynamic 
optimization problem is given by:  ( ) ( )
U
t t t t Q G R f , = Δ . 
  It seems that we have the following standard dynamic programming problem: 
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I show that the infinite horizon model of banks’ competition is not a standard dynamic 
programming problem, and it can be partitioned to a finite profit maximization problem 
that has the Markov chain property, and an infinite profit maximization problem with 
equilibrium values. That is, banks’ profit maximization is a repeated two-period 
constrained optimization problem in a finite period of time – until banks’ market share 
becomes equal – where the successive two-period parts of the game are independent from 
previous periods. After the market reached its steady state banks maximize equilibrium 
profit during infinite periods. 
 
Proposition 2: The infinite period competition of banks has the Markov-chain property, 
that is, the two-period portions of a bank’s history are independent of previous periods as 
regards information that banks learn about customers. In other words, the sequence of 
two-period games repeats itself in a bank’s history. 
 
Proof: the proposition immediately follows from the transition functions in (24) and from 
the definition of the initial loss that young good customers may accept. The initial loss 
controls the choice of good customers only for two periods until those customers are 
present in the market. In addition, the initial loss cannot be stable for its successive 
values must adjust to the banks’ market shares that converge to equality during finite 
periods.  ▄ 
 
If banks do not compete for known good customers – and they will not as we have 
already seen – smaller than average size banks drop out from the market while larger than 
average size banks stay. I shall discuss the issue in detail when banks would decide to 
stop serving unknown customers in the section of information sharing about bad 
customers. For banks that leave the market in period t the profit maximization problem is 
finite: its last period is when banks serve their known good customers. Those banks that 
continue to serve all types of customers and arrive at steady state of the market during 
finite periods will have equal market shares and each of them earns the same profit. 
 
Theorem 2: For banks which survive and are active when the market reaches its 
equilibrium, the profit maximization problem becomes “quasi-infinite” for they earn the 
same amount of profit in each period in equilibrium. 
 
Proof: Say that bank k is active in the market in steady state. Its profit will be: 





































=   (26) 
where the upper bar over variables stands for steady states values. The only question is 
whether banks arrive at steady state within finite periods. But this is inevitable, for banks 
with smaller than average market shares will only serve their known good customers 
during one period and then they drop out from the market. Consequently, the market 
  18share of the banks will equalize during (K – 1) periods at maximum. From that period on 
the market is in steady state.  ▄ 
 
Since banks serve only own known good customers the lower interest rate in steady state 
becomes: Δ − = R r . 
 
Lemma 3: the initial loss young good customers accept becomes zero in steady state: 
0 = Δ . 
 
Proof: It follows from the definition of Δthat ( ) Δ − = − = Δ δ δ r R . Since   and  0 ≥ Δ
0 > δ the equality can only hold if  0 = Δ . Consequently, for the interest rates we 
have: R r = . That is, there will not be different interest rates for known and for unknown 
customers in equilibrium.  ▄ 
 
We can also describe the optimum path of  t Δ beside former result that  0 lim = Δ = Δ
→ t T t . 
 
Lemma 4: The initial loss young good customers accept if banks use straight price 
discrimination is a decreasing and concave function of  :  t R
() () () ()
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The initial loss is a decreasing but convex function of t: 
() () () ()
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. The concavity of the 
initial loss function is a direct consequence of the concavity of the upper bound of  t Δ : 
. In addition, must always be satisfied. The initial loss must decrease in 
time for
t t R ≤ Δ 1 ≤ t R
0 lim = Δ → Δ
→ t T t , and  is a monotonous function of  . The convergence occurs 
with 
t Δ t R
ε ≤ − −1 t t R R  whereε is an arbitrarily small non-negative number.  ▄ 
 
The inequality conditions in (27) reflect the obvious assumption that banks want fewer 
customers to borrow with a low valuation at lower interest rates than at higher interest 
rates. But the banks incentive to increase the number of good customers who borrow is 
constrained by their profit maximization endeavor. The conditions in (28) show that as 
time goes by the banks’ interest in getting more good customers is weakened as small 
banks drop out from the market and market shares of the remaining banks equalize. 
Fewer banks will get the same number of bad customers that will reduce the banks’ 
profit. But banks have a countervailing incentive to balance the losses from an increased 
share of bad customers. This is why they do not want to drastically reduce the value of 
the initial loss that young good customers accept. Finally, the change of the initial loss is 
  19a decreasing function of time for the margin narrows between the interest rate charged to 
unknown customers and the interest rate paid by known good customers. 
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+ = customers in steady state. Profit 













= . Profit will be positive at any values of γ  if δ is 
not too small. Consequently, the second constraint will not bind in the profit 
maximization problem. The first constraint would only bind if a bank decided to leave the 
market after it served its own good customers. This immediately results in a finite 
maximization problem. 
  If banks stay in the market their profit maximization problem becomes: 
() () () ()
() .
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It will suffice to find the interest rates banks charge to customers before steady state and 
in equilibrium. The banks’ dynamic programming problem becomes: 
() () ( ) ( )





















R R k s
R
K
R R R k s
R R
k






































































2 ) 1 (
2




) ( ) (
1 2 1
1 1 1

































t t t t t t t









R R k s































) ( . 
  We need to discuss how market shares will change across banks. Since bad customers 
are distributed uniformly across banks, the market share of larger banks – larger than 1/K 
– will decrease, while the market share of banks with smaller than average market share 
will increase, the resultant force may have positive or negative sign depending on the size 
structure of the market. Say that M banks have larger than average and K – M banks have 
  20smaller than average market shares. Then denoting  and 
we get: 
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I shall denote  ) ( 2 ) ( ˆ M K t t t σ σ σ − =  in order to simplify notations. Summing over all k 
yields: 
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 is the number of all customers 
banks serve in period t. Substituting  2 1 2 + + + Δ − = t t t R r  into (34) and rearranging gives: 
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ˆ 2 + Δ σ δγ
will be very small that we shall ignore. But the expression in (35) is 
still a quadratic difference equation of second order in R. There is no explicit solution for 
and  , but banks can obtain a linear approximation of the interest rates  and  they 
charge in period t by substituting: 
t R t r t R ˆ
t r ˆ
R R R R R R t t t t + = ⇒ − = ˆ ˆ . After making the 
substitutions and ignoring non-linear terms we have: 
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where Z and Y are the collected constant terms. Now the difference equation has the 
form: 
Y R Z c bR aR R t t t + + + + = − + 1 1 . (37) 
The difference equation has two initial values . The equation has a unique 
general solution in the form of 
1 0   and   R R
) , , ( B A t g Rt =  if we can find function g for which: 
  21) , , 1 ( ); , , 0 ( 1 0 B A g R B A g R = = . Given the linearity conditions in (36) we can expect 
that the solution will have the form: , where  are some linear 
combinations of the initial values  . 
B A R
t t
t β α + = B A   and  
1 0   and   R R
  Assume that banks have found these interest rates and the solution for (36). Then 
bank k serves the following number of customers in period t: 
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 (38) 
There are three factors in competition that may prevent some banks from serving new 
customers as can be seen in (38): the banks’ market shares in period t – 2 and t – 1, and 
the shift of their market share in period t. If a bank was very large in the former periods 
and its market share just slightly decreased in period t it may not be capable of serving 
new customers in period t. The other possibility is that a bank started period t as medium-
sized and its market share increased to a large extent in period t then this bank may not be 
willing to serve new customers. If bank k serves customers in period t its profit becomes: 
K K
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Since  depends on the bank’s market share small banks will not be able to meet this 
condition. Banks with smaller market shares than what (40) implies will incur losses. 
Assuming perfect foresight of the banks until infinity this could not happen for small 
banks knowing that they will make losses would not sell loans to any customers. The 
market would and should be in its “golden age” equilibrium from the start. In case if 
small banks are still present in the market and they must leave in period t, fewer banks 
will serve the customers, but their market share will be reduced relative to their share in 
the previous period. The market converges to its steady state where banks’ market share 
will equalize. Now I present the equilibrium conditions of the market. 
) (k qt
  The equilibrium interest rate will be a linear function of the parameters, for 
σ ˆ becomes zero in equilibrium since market shares equalize. It is also important to note 
that the magnitude of the initial loss will decrease to zero in equilibrium as I have shown 
  22before. The interest rate customers pay in equilibrium, the number of customers they 
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  We can test the stability of the equilibrium interest rates by substituting the results 
from (41) into (36). We need to distinguish between two classes of market outcomes. The 
first class is when banks have unequal market shares. Then the equilibrium interest rate 
will be stable if: 
0 1 ) 1 ( > + − = b a P ,   , 0 1 ) 1 ( > − + = − b a P  and  1 ) 0 ( < = b P , (42) 
where  are the parameters of the original difference equation in (36).  b a   and  
  The other important case is when banks have equal market shares. Now the market is 
in its steady state. There is no more adjustment of the interest rates and market shares 
among banks. Obviously, we get the same results as in (41). Now I prove that banks will 
have identical market shares in equilibrium. 
 
Theorem 3: Market shares across banks will equalize in steady state. 
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  ▄ 
 
The above results have profound consequences on how we can think of the competition 
among banks in a market with unequal market shares of the players. While the banks’ 
market share equalizes – or is equal from the start – in both markets, the number of 
customers served, the interest rate charged, consequently consumer surplus and banks’ 
profit will be different in the two markets until banks’ market shares equalize. 
  An important conclusion from the above result is that large banks do not gain from 
sharing information about good customers if they sell loans at a lower interest rate to 
known good than to unknown customers. 
 
Theorem 4: Full information sharing is not in the large banks’ interest if they intend to 
charge a lower interest rate to known good than to unknown customers. Large banks are 
better off if they serve their own known good customers than if they try to steal other 
banks’ known good customers. 
 
                                                 
13 For instance, if  1 = δ ,  ) (γ π will be positive if  4 / 3 > γ . 
  23Proof: Since large banks can block competition for known good customers they do not 
need information about good customers of other banks, for they will only serve own good 
customers. 
  ▄ 
 
Since the large banks’ market share decreases period by period, this fact has 
countervailing effects on the large banks’ profit from unknown customers. Namely, the 
banks’ lower market share in the second period results in a smaller loss that comes from 
non-paying bad customers. This factor alone would increase the large banks’ total profit 
from two subsequent periods. But the large banks’ lower market share in the second 
period reduces their gain from repaying customers, too. 
  The position of the small banks just mirrors the large banks’ position. Small banks 
may be worse off without than with competition for known good customers. Small banks 
suffer a larger loss from bad customers in the second period as their market share 
increases, but the countervailing effect of their growing market share on the first period 
loss from bad customers is also stronger in the first period. And small banks also gain 
from keeping more known good customers. 
  Finally, I need to address the question whether banks would want to charge uniform 
interest rates to all customers under special circumstances.
14 Since young good customers 
would not have an interest to borrow at an initial loss profit would be lower than with 
price discrimination. Consequently, banks will not choose to apply uniform pricing if 
they can price discriminate among customers if they started with unequal market shares. 
But in case if market shares equalize, banks will not want to get an increasing number of 
customers. As a consequence, young good customers will not have the interest to accept 
an initial loss for banks do not offer a lower interest rate to known good customers. When 
the market reaches its steady state banks will charge uniform prices to all customers. 
  We have seen that large banks would not gain from joining a full information sharing 
agreement. But I cannot exclude the possibility that small banks form or join the credit 
bureau and share information about all customers they serve. If the market shares of these 
banks are identical they do not gain – they rather loose – from sharing information about 
good customers. If the small banks have different market shares, the lack of incentive to 
share information that we witnessed in the case of the large banks resurfaces among the 
small banks. Consequently, banks will not be motivated to voluntarily join a credit 
bureau. 
  Finally, a large bank can also engage in predatory pricing, forcing the smaller banks 
to exit the market and remain as a monopoly in the market for infinite periods. I cannot 
                                                 
14 Banks would maximize profit from infinite periods: 
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The first order condition would solve for a quadratic equation of second order in R. Banks would loose 
known good customers and young good unknown customers from not price discriminating, as can be seen 
from the profit function. 
  24exclude but I shall ignore this possibility for I do not discuss the issues of price 
competition in this paper. 
 
4. Information Sharing About Good Customers 
 
Each bank knows all good customers but banks maintain private information about bad 
customers. If banks serve known good and also unknown customers, known good 
customers could be allocated among banks by competition as in the full information 
sharing case. But banks can also keep all their known good customers by charging an 
interest rate that is adjusted to the interest rate good customers paid in the first period of 
their existence:  .  t t t R r Δ − = −1
  The allocation of bad customers will substantially change compared to previous 
modeling assumptions. Notably, each bad customer who is in the market will get the 
loan, for a known bad customer can go to another bank and take the loan as unknown in 
the second period. Bad customers never repay the loan – we saw that it is a dominant 
strategy to bad customers if they can acquire the loan without paying in both periods – 
that alters the number of known customers, too, who apply for the loan in the second 
period. The number of known good customers who borrow in the second period is: 
()
2







, or  () ( )
2







, depending on the fact whether banks 
apply “straight” or in “inverse” price discrimination. 
  As I have already shown in the full information sharing case – and it is also true with 
good information sharing – larger banks will attain higher profits on known good 
customers if they just keep their own known good customers and do not compete for the 
known good customers of the other banks. It would be even more so with good 
information sharing than in case if banks share full information, for banks cannot offer a 
very low interest rate to unknown customers since they can expect to receive more bad 
customers who never repay with good information sharing than in the full information 
sharing case. I shall discuss the allocation of unknown bad customers in a later section, 
when I turn to the case of no information sharing. While information sharing only about 
good customers has similar consequences to the competition for known good customers 
as in the case of full information sharing, information sharing only about good customers 
is identical to no information sharing as regards the allocation of bad customers across 
banks. 
 
5. Information Sharing About Bad Customers 
 
With information sharing about bad customers, banks serve their own known good 
customers and unknown customers. Some banks may decide to serve only the own 
known good customers. Banks turn known bad customers away. Young bad customers 
may repay the loan in the first period for the same reason as in the full information 
sharing case. Banks have the same alternatives with regard to pricing as in the full 
information sharing case. All the results that we have seen in the case of full information 
sharing will be identical if banks share information only about known bad customers. 
This is an important reason why banks will not have an interest to engage in full 
information sharing. 
  25  A distinctive feature of “bad information sharing” is that known good customers 
could go to another bank in their second period as unknown customers if banks would 
offer the loan at a lower interest rate to unknown than to known customers. This can only 
happen if banks apply inverse price discrimination. And this can be a good reason why 
banks would actually decide to choose inverse price discrimination. It is important to note 
that good customers who could not borrow in the first period may be able to borrow in 
the second period for the interest rate to unknown customers decreases. Bank k will 
maximize: 
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  Now the interest rate banks charge to known good customers is not connected inter-
temporally to the interest rate that banks apply to unknown customers. Banks will choose 
2
1
= t R  that maximizes their profit from known good customers. Banks find the lower 
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The equilibrium interest rate will be the same as with straight price discrimination since 
good customers cannot be indifferent between borrowing in the current period as 
  26unknown, or to borrow in the next period as unknown. The number of customers served 
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The first and the third condition can be fulfilled but the second condition will be violated 
at all realistic values of δ γ   and   . Consequently, I have the following theorem.  
 
Theorem 5: Inverse price discrimination cannot be a long-term equilibrium solution for 
banks. 
 
Proof: Theorem 5 follows from (49).  ▄ 
 
An interesting and important case in “bad information sharing” is when J banks 
decide to serve only their known good customers. This can happen to 
banks that are small enough to incur losses had they continued to serve all customers. If 
some banks decide to sell exclusively to their own known good customers this will be the 
banks’ last period in the market, for known good customers exit after the current period. 
(And I assumed that once a bank stopped serving unknown customers it would not serve 
unknown customers again.) A bank will choose to sell only to its known good customers 
– then exit the market – if it’s profit from known good and from unknown customers 
during infinite periods is smaller than its profit from the two customers groups until last 
period plus the profit it makes on known good customers in the current period: 
( K J < = ,... 1 , 0 )
) ( ) ( ) (













< . (50) 
  If a bank decides to serve only its known good customers it will charge the same – 
higher – interest rate other banks ask from their unknown customers with “straight” price 
discrimination, for good customers would be unknown to other banks. Consequently, 
they could get the loan only with the same terms as young unknown customers. Denoting 
the joint market share of banks that serve only good known customers , 
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Banks that will have both known good and unknown customers serve 
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− = −  non-paying unknown customers in period t. As I showed 
in the full information sharing case banks that sell to known and to unknown customers 
will charge   to their known good customers.  t t t R r Δ − = −1
  Banks that sell to all customers may not know that some banks will sell only to 
known good customers. There are different ways to tackle this problem. I assume that the 
J banks announce first that they will serve only their good known customers. From this 
point on banks that serve all types customers maximize profits as in the full information 
sharing case. The only difference between the two models is that banks’ market share on 












customers and 1/J bad customers in period t. 
  A bank that serves only own good known customers will get 




R R R n s
j g
t t t t t
t 2
1 2 ) 1 (
2
1 1 ) (
) (
1 1 2 − − − − − −
+
− − Δ +
=  (53) 
known good customers and earn the following profit during the current period: 
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  A bank will choose to serve only known good customers and then leave the market if 
the bank’s profit in the current period from known good customers at the interest rate set 
by  banks exceeds the profit it could have earned had he served unknown 
customers and by doing so it would have increased the number of banks in the market for 
unknown customers from () to
( J K − )
J K − ( ) 1 + − J K . The condition can be obtained by 
adjusting the number of banks that serve known good and unknown customers 
to() .  1 + − J K
  Finally, I need to discuss what happens if banks decide to serve all customers at a 
uniform interest rate. This case is identical with what we have already seen in the full 
information sharing case. Consequently, banks will not choose this strategy, for it is 
dominated by the strategy of price discrimination. 
 
6. No Information Sharing 
 
If banks do not share information there will be two markets: one for known good 
customers and another one for unknown customers. Banks sell to their own good 
customers. Old bad customers may go to another bank they have not banked with. The no 
information-sharing regime is identical with information sharing about good customers as 
regards banks’ strategy options and optimum strategy choices. Banks will not sell loans at 
a uniform interest rate to all customers. Thus, banks sell to known good customers at the 
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known good customers, for there will not be bad customers who would repay when they 
are young. (Bad customers can go to another bank in their second period on the market.) 
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where  is the number of “surviving” bad customers whom bank k served in the 
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After summing over all k and rearranging while neglecting quadratic terms in the last part 
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We can find the interest rates banks charge to unknown customers in period t by solving 
the difference equation in (57). The equilibrium interest rate obtains from: 
( )
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 customers,  (59) 
and profit becomes: 
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− = . (60) 
Banks’ profit can be positive if: 
K







15 If banks do not share information, 
the local stability of the interest rate in steady state will depend on the share of bad 
customers in the entire banking population and on the spread of the banks’ market shares. 
  The interest rate banks charge to unknown customers will be higher than with full 
information sharing or with information sharing about bad customers for there are more 
bad customers in the market who will be served. In addition, bad customers never repay 
the loan that further reduces the banks’ expected profit. Profit will be lower without 
information sharing than with information sharing about bad or all customers. Banks earn 
a lower profit on unknown customers without information sharing than with full or with 
“bad” information sharing. But banks’ profit on unknown customers will be the same 
                                                 
15 For instance, if  , the fraction of good customers must be at least 77 percent of the entire 
population. 
10 = K
  29with no information sharing and with information sharing about good customers. On the 
other hand, banks’ profit on known good customers may be higher with no information 
sharing or with good information sharing than with other information sharing 
arrangements, for bad customers do not repay in the first period and they do not return to 
their original bank as “good” in the second period. A countervailing force that will reduce 
profit from known good customers results from the fact that the interest rate banks charge 
to unknown customers will be higher than with full or with bad information sharing. 
Consequently, the number of good customers who borrow when young will be lower 
without information sharing or with information sharing about good than in other 
arrangements. 
  Before the market reaches its steady state, banks’ market share and the number of bad 
customers they serve will change period by period with no information sharing, or with 
information sharing only about good customers. The large bank that had a high 
proportion of unknown bad customers in the previous period will get a much smaller 
share of bad customers from the other banks in the current period. Consequently, it may 
want to increase the number of customers it serves in the current period, for it can be sure 
that most of its new customers will be good. But the smaller banks will have the opposite 
intentions now, which will result in a higher interest rate for unknown customers than the 
large bank would have wanted. The interest of the banks will be reversed in the next 
period. As a result, the market share of the large banks decreases and the market share of 
the small banks increases in that period when the large banks get fewer bad customers of 
the other banks. And the market share of the large banks grows again, while the market 
share of the smaller banks drops in periods when the large bank gets more bad customers 
from other banks. 
  While no information sharing leads to higher interest rates and to lower profits for the 
whole group of banks than full information sharing or information sharing about bad 
customers, the allocation of profit will cyclically change period by period. Banks will 
earn higher profits when the share of bad customers in their individual customer pool is 
relatively low, while the same banks lose profits when their customer base is “poisoned” 
by many bad unknown customers. Consequently, banks do not have an unambiguous 
attitude to no information sharing. They will find no information sharing much more 
attractive than any form of information sharing in some periods that reduces the incentive 
to join an information sharing regime. 
 
Theorem 6: Banks’ short-term interest not to share information is in conflict with their 
long-term interest to share information about bad customers if banks arrive at the 
current period with different numbers of bad customers. 
 
Proof: A bank’s profit will be larger in period t without information sharing than with 
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>  can earn higher profit 
without than with information sharing in period t.  ▄ 
 
I need to add that no information sharing can only dominate information sharing about 
bad if the number – not just the market share – of the banks changed over time, for it 
would not have been possible for the banks to get bad customers in different numbers in 
subsequent periods. If the number of banks has always been K then the number of bad 
customers a bank gets without information sharing in period t will be:  2 2
) 1 )( 1 2 (
K
K γ − −
. 
But in case if the number of banks has changed over time it is possible for a bank to 
receive bad customers in fluctuating numbers. 
  I can conclude that banks’ interest to share information depends on their size and also 
on the number of banks that operate in the market. Banks do not gain from full 
information sharing and they may lose from good information sharing. The best choice 
banks have is to share information about bad customers. Although information sharing 
about bad customers is beneficial to all banks in the long run it may not be in the banks’ 
interest in the short run. Consequently, myopic banks with large market shares may 




If the private credit market is regulated, the social planner seeks to maximize total social 
welfare from private loans. There are several ways to implement market regulation. 
 
Benchmark: No Learning 
 
If there is no persistent customer history, banks – and customers – cannot learn from 
previous periods. It may still be a reasonable objective to maximize social benefit from 
private loans. If I disregard the utility of bad customers and everyone gets the loan who 






















































As can be seen from (62) social welfare will always be negative. 
  If I assume full information sharing or information sharing about bad customers then 
banks will avoid losses by not giving loans to known bad customers. If truthful 
information sharing can be enforced, banks may compete – and I assume that regulators 
are capable of inducing them to compete – for known good customers. Unknown 
customers may accept an initial loss in order to be recognized as reliable in the next 
period. Banks’ profit becomes: 
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The social planner neglects the welfare of bad customers. Thus, consumer surplus in 
period t is given by: 








1 1 1 1
2
CS
R R R R R r
CS











Δ + − −
+







































δ t t t t
t
R R R R
r . (66) 
I can find the lower interest rate after I solved for the higher interest rate banks charge to 
unknown customers. From the first order condition for the higher interest rate I get the 
implicit function for :  1 + t R
() .
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Solving the simultaneous equations (66) and (67) yields the interest rates banks charge to 
known good and to unknown customers. Similarly, I get the equilibrium interest rates by 
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  Regulators would favor full information sharing or information sharing about bad 
customers to other arrangements for social welfare would be larger under these regimes 
than  with  no  information  sharing.  It can be seen that consumer surplus will always be 
positive and banks’ profit is also positive if the share of good customers is not extremely 
low. 
 
8. Banks’ competition in transition markets 
 
I turn now to transition markets. Transition markets differ from mature markets at least in 
one important respect: there is an initial period in newly emerging markets when 
competition among banks unfolds. We need to see whether this initial period effect has 
lasting consequences on how the market develops after the initial phase. 
 
  32The initial period 
 
Banks establish their market share in the initial period by selling to customers in a 
number of   We may think of these banks as a group that consists of a 
large bank – usually the former state-owned monopoly in the private accounts market –
and (n – 1) smaller banks. The large bank will be called bank 1, and I denote the number 
of customers it serves in period t  . I already made the assumption that the smaller 
banks have capacity constraints in the initial period and they sell to customers up to their 
capacity. That is, total capacity K of the small banks is 
). ( ),....., 1 ( 0 0 n q q
) 1 ( t q
0 0 0 ) 1 ( Q K q Q < ≤ − . In addition, 






0 ) ( ˆ ≥ . Then the large bank faces residual demand that has not been served 
by the small banks. This simplifying assumption renders the analysis more tractable, 
without reducing the generality of our main findings about banks’ strategic behavior with 
regard to information sharing. The small banks sell to  ) 1 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ 0
1




, and bank 1 sells 
to the remaining customers:  where  is the total number of 
customers served,   is the capacity of bank j, j≠1, and 
), 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( 0 0 0 − − = Q Q q 0 Q
) ( ˆ0 j q ) 1 ( 0 − Q is the number of 
customers served by all small banks, but not by bank 1 in the initial period. Since the two 
alternative assumptions about the banks’ behavior do not result in qualitatively different 
behaviors of the banks, I shall choose the second alternative where the small banks sell 
up to their capacity. Each customer is unknown in the initial period, consequently banks 
cannot price discriminate. But banks can sell to good customers who are willing to suffer 
an initial loss. I present only this alternative now, I do not deal with the uniform price 
case. The large bank serves the following number of customers in the initial period: 
() .
1
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Bank 1’s expected profit in the initial period is given by: 
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A small bank will earn the following profit
16: 
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Taking the first order condition, summing over all k and rearranging yields the following 
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≥ , otherwise small banks would not stay in 
the market. 




Current and future periods 
 
Banks start the second period,  1 = t  with market shares K i
Q
i q





0 = = . I 
assume that the small banks can also sell   loans to customers in the current 
period, that is, no bank has capacity constraints from the first period on. Whatever 
information sharing system – or no information sharing – exists in the market, banks’ 
profit in the second period becomes: 
) ( ˆ ) ( 0 1 j q j q ≥
) , ( ) ( ) ( 1 0 I k k k δπ π π + = , (73) 
where  ) ( 0 k π is bank k’s profit in the initial period and  ) , ( 1 I k π  is the bank’s profit in the 
second period depending on the information sharing arrangement in the market. We 
already know that banks prefer to share information about bad customers to sharing 
information about good customers or to full information sharing. In addition, banks 
choose not to share information rather than sharing information only about good 
customers. 
  Banks will play the same game in transition markets as in mature markets from the 
second period on. Other conditions – market regulation, the regime of information 
sharing, the rewarding strategy toward good customers, the fraction of good and bad 
customers, the discount factor – being equal, they find the profit maximizing interest rate 
and the optimum number of customers by maximizing the same expected profits from 
infinite periods. Banks in transition market can apply the same profit maximization rules 
as banks in mature market with one important exception. Since “transition” banks know 
how the initial period interest rate will affect the interest rate in the second period they 
can use this knowledge to simplify the optimization problem. Say that banks established 
the profit maximizing interest rate they are going to charge to unknown customers in the 
second period as:  Then banks need to find the profit maximizing 
interest rate from the simultaneous equations: 
). , ( 0 2
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Technically this means that banks do not need to solve a difference equation of second 
order since they get   from (72). Ultimately, the banks’ problem becomes:  ( 0
1
1 R R
− Φ = )
                                                 
17There is an opportunity for banks in the initial period that deserves special attention. Namely, bank 1 may 
use the initial period to gain as large a market share as possible. The interest rate at which the large bank 
could break even in the initial period can be derived from: 
.
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q R  We need to see later whether a 
bank would choose a strategy by which it just breaks even in the initial period and maximizes profits in 
subsequent periods. 
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which is a difference equation of second order. It has the form: b aR R + = 1 2 , where a and 
b are the parameters obtained from (74). Banks can find the profit maximizing interest 


















However, the equilibrium interest rate will be the same in both markets. The interest rate 








  Another important issue in a transition market is how would the initial period 
influence a bank’s decision about whom it wants to sell loan to in subsequent periods? A 
bank will choose to serve only its known good customers during the second period – and 
exit the market – if its expected profit is larger than the profit it could earn during two 
periods: 
) , ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 0 1 0 I k k I k k k k
G G δπ π δπ π δπ π > ⇒ + > + . (76) 
Banks may be better off to earn “quick” profits on reliable customers then leave the 
market rather than tagging along if the future is very uncertain, that is, the discount factor 
is high. This is not an unknown phenomenon in the transition markets (that usually 
develop in transition countries). But banks have different perspectives about the future if 
they have different market shares. It may seem at the first glance that a large bank will be 
the one who may favor current profit to future – uncertain – profits, for the large bank 
starts with a large share of good customers, and bad customers allocate themselves 
uniformly across banks in the initial period. But the large bank has brighter prospects for 
future periods than the small banks. The large bank’s prospects are better if banks share 
information only about bad customers or in case if there is no information sharing, and its 
prospects are gloomier if banks share information about good customers or about all 
customers. Sharing information about good customers or about all customers may expose 
the large bank to fiercer competition for known good customers from smaller banks. 
Sharing information only about good customers is the worst case for banks and especially 
for large banks, for they may loose many good customers while the share of bad 
customers does not monotonously decline. If the large bank has many young bad 
customers in the current period, these customers leave the bank and go to other banks in 
the next period. But the large bank can expect a massive inflow of bad customers again 
after the next period, many of those coming from other banks. 
  The small banks earn smaller profit on good customers in the initial period for their 
capacity is constrained and they get an equal share of bad customers. But the smaller 
banks can expect lower profits – it may be even negative – in the long run, especially if 
there is no information sharing or there is information sharing only about bad customers 
among banks. Consequently, it is the smaller rather than the larger banks that would 
choose to sell private loans to known good customers then exit the market. 
  After the initial period passes banks in the transition market will behave as the banks 
in mature markets. But the initial period may have a decisive effect on how can banks 
develop in the future: are they facing low or even negative expected profits as small 
banks and will be forced to leave the market before it reaches its steady state, or can earn 
positive profits and witness the convergence of the market to steady state with banks 
having equal market shares. 
  35  I need to mention here that I ignored the possibility that small banks form a coalition 
against one or more larger banks. Small banks would be fairly successful in doing so if 
their joint market share does not lag far behind the market share of the large bank. If 
small banks jointly have a larger market share than the large bank, they may become the 
dominant player if they collude. 
  It is also clear from the discussion that the smaller banks would favor other 
information sharing arrangements than the large banks. Sharing information about good 
customers or about all customers is more beneficial to a small than to a large bank. This 
is why large and small banks can hardly agree, what kind of an information sharing 
arrangement they should implement. Small and large banks are to each other as woman 
and man in the vivid description of the Hungarian writer, Frigyes Karinthy: “A woman 
and a man can never understand each other for they have entirely contradictory desires: 
the woman longs for a man and the man longs for a woman.” The platform banks may 




The literature on information sharing among banks is very rich. But I have found only a 
few papers that address the issue of information transfer among economic actors when 
the same piece of private information can be “good news” or “bad news” depending on 
the actors’ economic strength.
18 Athey and Bagwell (2001) analyze collusive behavior in 
a price competition setting where agents have different market shares. They conclude that 
collusion requires that large agents relinquish market share. Novshek and Sonnenshein 
(1982) conclude that full information sharing or no information sharing can equally 
support Nash equilibria in oligopolistic competition. We have seen that this is not the 
case in private credit markets when banks need to decide what information sharing 
arrangement they are ready to implement. Gal-Or (1985) asserts that no information 
sharing is the unique Nash equilibrium in Cournot competition if agents have private 
information about demand. This conclusion seems to have a limited relevance especially 
in credit card markets. Lode Li (1985) argues that no information sharing is the unique 
equilibrium if information sharing would be about a common parameter of the market or 
the agents’ efficiency. Amir Ziv (1993) points to the fact that information sharing may be 
hampered by moral hazard if agents use private information strategically in competition. 
Finally, Vives (2002) argues that having private information is a much more powerful 
tool in oligopolistic competition than having large market share. I arrived at different 
conclusions than most of the authors mentioned above. Namely, I did not find 
information sharing and especially its form neutral to competition. I can agree with Vives 
that private information may be more relevant than market share, but in case if a large 
actor has private information he can use it in a completely different way than if a small 
actor has the same piece of information. I have also found that no information sharing is 
not a focal Nash equilibrium in market settings when sharing information has strategic 
implications to the actors’ expected benefits. At this point I need to emphasize that the 
two-period game most papers discuss does not always suit to the problem that is going to 
be addressed in that framework. I have found that an infinite horizon approach may be 
much more appropriate if competition has important dynamic aspects. Another important 
                                                 
18 Milgrom (1981) discusses strategic settings when information can be good or bad news. 
  36lesson I learned was that it is critical whether the analyst chooses a quantity competition 
or a price competition model to address information sharing. I decided to apply a quantity 
competition model but I can see its shortcomings and constraints. Price competition may 
be more appropriate to analyze markets with well-known characteristics. I could have 
explained competition for known good customers in a more realistic way in a price 
competition model than in a Cournot model. I decided to apply the quantity competition 
approach for I wanted to focus on the credit market for unknown customers. It may be an 
important topic for future research whether the two approaches can be usefully mixed 
within one model.
19
  The model I outlined above works with several simplifying assumptions. I ignored 
the opportunity of changing customer behavior: learning from past experience and 
exerting effort if the banks reward such a behavior. (That is, I ignored the issues of 
adverse selection and moral hazard.) I worked with simple demand functions. I made 
fairly restrictive assumptions about customer behavior. I did not always control for 
boundary conditions. But all these shortcomings notwithstanding, the models outlined 
above allow us to draw some important conclusions.  
  If one compares banks’ profit from known good and from unknown customers with 
information sharing about good customers, and profit from the same groups of customers 
without information sharing, it is clear that no information sharing results in higher 
expected profits to banks than information sharing about good customers if collecting and 
sharing information has some additional costs. Comparing no information sharing and 
information sharing about bad customers leads to the conclusion that information sharing 
about bad customers is better in terms of expected profits than no information sharing. 
We have also seen that information sharing about bad customers beats full information 
sharing and banks will also prefer it to good information sharing. I conclude that – under 
identical market characteristics – banks would benefit from sharing information about 
bad customers but they would not want to share information about good customers. 
  We could also see that the large banks have different incentives to information 
sharing than small banks. A large bank has less incentive to share information about its 
bad customers when it releases a large number of such customers to the market and 
“poisons” the customer base of other banks. This incentive becomes weaker when bad 
customers are now at the smaller banks in a large number and the large bank can expect 
many bad customers to come in the next period. It is also true that a large bank would 
sooner refuse to share information about good customers than the small banks for it 
would loose more than a small bank in the competition for good customers. 
  What kind of a bank has more incentive to serve only its known good customers? The 
answer to this question depends on the proportion of good and bad customers and the 
number of banks in the market. In addition, it depends on the discount factor. We have 
seen that with no information sharing or with information sharing about good customers a 
small bank can easily end up with negative profits for it can get the same number – or 
even a larger number – of bad customers in some periods as the larger bank. But a large 
bank may also have a strong incentive to serve only its good customers then exit if the 
share of bad customers is large in the market. 
  Banks that stay in the market will witness convergence to equalized market shares. 
The speed and the smoothness of this convergence are again affected by the former 
                                                 
19 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) suggested a similar approach to problems with quantity pre-commitment. 
  37distribution of market shares and by the information-sharing regime banks can rely on. A 
market with strongly unequal market shares and with no information sharing will 
converge to steady state after more fluctuations than a market with more balanced market 
shares and with information sharing about bad customers. If the market stars up with 
banks having equal market shares, steady state is reached in the current period and banks 
have identical incentives to share information. 
  I have worked with an infinite horizon model but I was able to simplify it to a finite 
horizon dynamic programming problem plus an infinite horizon optimization in steady 
state. An important aspect of the infinite horizon deserves special attention. Since banks 
compete for unknown customers, the number of unknown bad customers will be smaller 
for large banks and this number will be larger for small banks than what their markets 
share would imply. Consequently, large banks lose and small banks gain market share in 
subsequent periods. Ultimately, market shares equalize in steady state. And as we have 
seen, banks with different market shares have opposing interests while banks with equal 
or very similar market shares can easily agree on information sharing. But until the 
market shares of the banks are different, their contradictory interests can be sufficiently 
described with a quasi-infinite model. 
  An exciting issue of strategic information sharing is why do banks form or join a 
credit bureau at all? Would it not be more beneficial to banks to directly trade with 
information? There may be cost saving effects of joining a credit bureau, but are there 
other considerations that render a joint information pool more desirable to banks than to 
deal with information transacting directly? If information sharing is a strategic decision – 
and we have seen it is – then a credit bureau may serve as an implicit contract among 
banks not to abuse private information in competition. This is a huge topic that I cannot 
address in the current paper. 
  Finally, banks will face an “initial period effect” in transition markets that may force 
small banks to exit before the market stabilizes. And as we saw if the number of banks 
that serve unknown customers changes it alters the game among the surviving banks. The 
large bank would benefit from sharing information about bad customers in the transition 
market, but the magnitude of its benefit depends on the proportion of the good customers 
within the entire banking population. Since information sharing about bad customers is 
not against the interest of the large bank – and as we saw before it enhances social 
welfare – it would make everyone better off if this information-sharing regime was 
implemented. Consequently, regulatory agencies could have an important role to play in 
shaping the private credit markets in transition markets. Transition markets become 
mature markets after the first two initial periods and banks that survive will behave as 
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